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of judicial rather than legislative discretion; for, whether the court
intends to restrict moral obligations to claims that would entitle
the relator to relief against a private party, or whether the exceptions to the general test must spring only from the court's conscience,
the result is the some: in cases of moral obligation in West Virginia,
the legislature (after originally instituting the action) stands on no
higher a level than a lower court in an ordinary action or suit, or
than an administrative agency in its hearings of proceedings.
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OF CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS NOT PRESERVED ON THE RECORD

Petitioner was convicted of disorderly conduct for violating a
Chicago ordinance concerning which the trial judge gave an instruction abridging the right of freedom of speech, to which petitioner
did not except. The ground on which he based his appeal to the
state appellate courts was that the ordinance as applied to his conduct violated his right of freedom of speech. Following affirmance
in the appellate and supreme courts of Illinois, Chicago v. Terminiello, 332 Ill. App. 17, 74 N. E.2d 45 (1947); 400 Ill. 23, 79 N.
E.2d 39 (1949), the case went on certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court without specification of the erroneous instruction
as ground for review in the application for the writ. Held, reversed.
The ordinance as construed being unconstitutional, the fact that
petitioner did not except to nor contest the instruction left it none
the less ripe for review by the Supreme Court. Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949) (5-4 decision).
The majority opinion relies on Stromberg v. California, 283
U. S. 359 (1931). Although the Stromberg case substantially upholds the decision in the principal case, a distinction exists, however significant, which would have permitted an opposite result
in the principal case under available authority. In the Stromberg
case the trial court instructed, following the express terms of the
statute, that appellant could be convicted if her conduct.fell within
any of the purposes set forth therein. There was a general verdict
of guilty. Appellant did not except to the instruction but, on
appeal to the state appellate court, contended that one of the proscriptions of the statute was invalid under the Fourteenth Amend-

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1949

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [1949], Art. 7
CASE COMMENTS
ment. The state court affirmed the conviction, People v. Mintz,
62 Cal. App. 677, 290 Pac. 93 (1930), and this contention was made
the basis of appeal to the United States Supreme Court, where appellant's views were sustained. In the principal case, petitioner
did not except to the instruction but maintained that the ordinance as applied to his conduct was violative ofi his right of freedom
of speech. On appeal to the state appellate courts, the instruction
was not claimed as error nor was it mentioned in their opinions,
the Illinois Supreme Court saying, in part, "The sole question
resolves itself into whether the conduct and utterances of defendant
constituted a breach of the peace ....The evidence amply supports
the verdict of the jury.. ." Chicago v. Terminiello, 400 Ill. 23, 33,
79 N. E.2d 39, 45 (1948) (italics supplied).
The issue argued
before the United States Supreme Court was whether petitioner's
speech was composed of "fighting words" not protected by the
Constitution. That difference between the Stromberg and principal
case posed the question whether the Supreme Court may reverse
a decision of the highest court of a state on a point not brought
by the record before that court and hence not a part of the judgntent declared by that court. The case was one of first impression.
in McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,309 U. S.
40, 434 (1940), it was said that "only in exceptional cases, and
then only in cases coming from the federal courts", would the
Court consider questions urged by a petitioner "not pressed or
passed" upon in the court below; and that, in cases coming from a
state court, reasons of a "peculiar force" forbade the Court to
decide questions not presented, urged, or decided therein or to
consider grounds of attack not raised below. The Court concluded,
"'we should hold ourselves free to set aside or revise their determinations only so far as they are erroneous and error is not to be
predicated upon their failure to decide questions not presented,"
id. at 435 (italics supplied); accord, Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S.474
(1946); New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308 (1937);
Blair v. Oesterlein Co., 275 U. S.220 (1927) (not involving a constitutional question). However, the McGoldrick case involved the
commerce clause of the Constitution and not freedom of speech.
Moreover the Court there disposed of-the cause by remand for
further proceedings, while in the principal case, the alternatives
were to affirm the state court notwithstanding the erroneous instruction or to reverse on the point not decided by the state court.
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The petition for certiorari in the principal case urged the question of whether the content of petitioner's speech was composed of
"fighting words" not protected by the Constitution, without mentioning the erroneous instruction by the trial court nor argument
addressed to it. This would appear a manifest limitation of the
scope of review accorded under the text of the Supreme Court
Rules. Rule 38, subd. 2, 306 U. S. 716 (1939), reads in part as
follows: "The petition for certiorari shall contain ... the questions
presented; and the reasons relied on for allowance of the writ. Only
the questions specifically brought forward by the petition .

.

. will

be considered." In Flourney v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 259 (1944),
it was said that, on application for certiorari to a state court, the
Supreme Court would not pass upon or consider federal questions
not assigned as error or designated in the points to be relied upon,
even though properly presented to and passed upon by the state
court, a proposition as authority for which the court cited National
Lzcorice Co. v. N. L. R. B., 309 U. S. 350 (1940) and General Talking
Pictures Co. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U. S. 175 (1938); cf. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587 (1936) (by implication). But, in the principal case, the error was not only not
assigned; it was not even presented to or passed upon by the state
court.
Whatever its merits, the case adds nothing to constitutional
law. Cf. 1 MERCER L. REv. 114 (1949); 9 LAw. GUILD REv. 70 (1949).
Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Jackson and the opinions of the judges in the state appellate courts
expressed no disagreement regarding the substantive rights and
limitations with respect to freedom of speech. The significance of
the case, it is submitted, is the extent to which the Court has disiegarded its rules of procedure as well as meanings attributed to
them by language in prior decisions, in protecting this basic
freedom.
W. E. C.

MASTER AND SERVANT-RECOVERY

FOR SILICOSIS UNDER BOILER

INSPECTION ACT AND FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AT.-P, fireman on D railroad, allegedly contracted silicosis as a result of
inhalation of silica dust emanating from defective sanders on D's

locomotives. P charged violations of the Boiler Inspection Act, 36
STAT. 913 (1911), as amended, 43 STAT. 659
(1924), 45
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